Banks are at risk of repeating the 2008 crisis after transferring 18 million BTC worth to shadow lenders

Since 2008, U.S. banks have “reduced” their credit risk by shifting much of it to non-bank lenders.

Since 2008, banks have shifted a proportion of their lending to non-banks, such as private credit funds, making non-banks the fastest-growing lending category.

This shift does not suggest a 2008-style crisis again today, but it does indicate where problems may first surface if cracks in private credit begin to appear.

This week, traders, analysts and investment firms are revisiting a common question: Are U.S. banks planning a repeat of 2008?

Based on publicly available numbers, the clear answer is no. The same argument also points to actual changes in bank balance sheets that deserve more rigorous consideration.

The chart below, which is circulating on X, shows that bank lending to non-depository financial institutions (NDFIs) has increased by 2,320% over 15 years.

The FDIC memo records that these loans will reach $1.32 trillion by the third quarter of 2025, up from $56 billion in the first quarter of 2010, making this category the fastest-growing lending category since the 2008-2009 crisis.

Since 2008, big banks have pulled out of risky direct lending, but have also provided funding to non-bank lenders who have entered the picture. The group includes private credit vehicles, mortgage finance companies, securitization structures, and other parts of the shadow banking system. Instead of disappearing, the risks have moved elsewhere.

But that doesn’t mean banks are already in trouble. The FDIC’s latest industry profile shows that the banking sector generated $295 billion in revenue in 2025, recorded a return on assets of 1.24% in the fourth quarter, unrealized securities losses decreased to $306 billion, and the number of troubled banks at 60, still within the agency’s normal non-crisis range. These are not numbers for a system that is already panicking.

The question is where will losses, redemptions and liquidity pressures occur as more links in the lending chain are added?

In the case of cryptocurrencies, that changes the timing of the stress. A typical banking panic starts at the banks. Under the current structure, stress can start at the fund, warehouse line, or lending vehicle and trickle down to the bank if the mark declines, if the borrower defaults on payments, or if investors demand cash faster than the assets can be sold.

Post-crisis changes are now reflected in numbers.

Looking at the official numbers, it’s hard to ignore structural changes. Bank loans to NDFIs compounded at an annual rate of 21.9% from 2010 to 2024, according to the FDIC.

The agency’s analysis shows that by the third quarter of 2025, the total amount would reach $1.32 trillion, or about 10% of bank lending.

Not every dollar in that bucket is private credit, and exposures in this category carry varying levels of risk. Still, this size indicates that the majority of credit intermediation currently resides in financial institutions that do not accept deposits and provide less disclosure than banks.

That nuance is important. NDFI is a broad label. This may include mortgage brokers, consumer finance companies, securitization vehicles, private equity funds, other non-bank lenders, and private credit funds.

If read carelessly, the entire bucket becomes one bet on your personal credit. A more accurate interpretation is that banks have built a large and rapidly growing set of links to the broader nonbank system.

Private credit is one of the visible parts of that system, and one of the most visible, as it has grown during a long period of rising interest rates, tighter bank regulation, and steady investor demand for yield.

A Federal Reserve staff note makes this point astutely. Commitment credit lines from the largest U.S. banks to private credit vehicles are estimated to have grown from about $8 billion in the first quarter of 2013 to about $95 billion by the fourth quarter of 2024, with about $56 billion already drawn down.

The same work brought the total bank facilities committed to private credit and private equity to approximately $322 billion.

That does not prove that the entire system is about to collapse. The Fed’s own conclusions were more restrained. Direct financial stability risks from this channel appear limited for now, as large banks appear able to absorb large drawdowns.

Still, the growing links between banks and private financial institutions requires close attention.

This risk is best described as a continuation of bank funding for parts of the lending chain and a change in where stress first appears.

In the public markets, losses appear quickly. Private markets can be slow-moving because marks are updated less frequently, assets are less liquid, and investor withdrawals are governed by product rules.

This delay can give the system a semblance of calm until cash demands arise and tighter pricing becomes necessary.

The global context points in the same direction. The non-bank financial intermediation sector will account for about 51% of total global financial assets in 2024 and continue to grow at about twice the pace of banks, according to the latest report from the Financial Stability Board.

This is no longer a special case of the United States. For years now, credit has been moving to institutions outside of the classic banking model, and the U.S. private credit boom is part of that broader pattern.

Why trade is being tested now

The issue became more urgent as structural data arrived while public charges began to appear on private credit. Some private credit vehicles limit or control withdrawals, but JPMorgan tightened some lending against its private credit portfolio after the price drop.

These events stop short of establishing a market-wide break and instead indicate where pressure may first appear, such as in funding liquidity, loan terms, and collateral values.

That’s why we need to exercise restraint when making comparisons to 2008.

The same FDIC report that has once again garnered attention also shows that banks are entering this phase in a better profit position than they were during past crises. The public banking system is not in free fall.

A bigger concern is the financing structure, where stress from nonbank lenders could flow back to banks if private assets continue to reprice or investors need cash before selling or refinancing their loans.

Borrower quality and refinancing deserve more attention than broad slogans. In a recent interview with the Financial Times, the chairman of Partners Group said private credit default rates could double in the coming years from a historical average of around 2.6%. This is not an official baseline and should not be treated as such.

However, it captures important pressure points. A system built on long-term private loans, low interest rates, and regular credit lines can appear stable until defaults increase and refinance lines tighten at the same time.

For Bitcoin, the setup is messy in the short term, but cleaner in the medium term. At the time of writing, BTC was trading around $73,777, holding 58.5% market power, and was up 0.05% in 24 hours, 4.55% in 7 days, and 7.51% in 30 days, according to cryptoprune data.

This price trend suggests that the cryptocurrency is not trading as if a banking event has already begun. If a broader credit crunch does occur, the first move is likely to be a sell-off of liquid assets, and Bitcoin remains one of the most liquid assets on global markets.

The longer the discussion expands, and the deeper the loss of trust in how the financial system leverages and values ​​private wealth, the easier it will be to articulate Bitcoin’s appeal as an asset outside the banking stack.

This second-order effect is the real contagion risk for cryptocurrencies.

Private credit strains will not automatically transfer capital to Bitcoin from day one. You can easily create the opposite movement.

But over time, if banks have to exit, if funds have difficulty raising capital, or if more investors start asking who really owns the credit risk, the case for holding some assets outside of that system will become easier. We know the deal. Bank data will be placed in the new macro settings.

What to watch for in the next data round

The next stage of this story will likely be revealed through three checks. That is, whether more private credit vehicles limit withdrawals or take larger marks, whether banks continue to lend to them on the same terms, and whether NDFI loan book volumes continue to grow at a pace similar to that recorded by the FDIC over the past decade.

This is where the current discussion becomes more specific than the usual “shadow banking” label. As banks step up lending to non-bank lenders, middle-market borrowers can immediately feel it through cost and access, even if no household has ever heard of the acronym NDFI.

If the fund sells as much as possible to meet redemptions, public credit can capture some of the price discovery that private books have avoided. If the fund does not sell and banks continue to provide funding, the exposure will remain in the system longer.

None of these paths require a repeat of 2008. All of them can still change the flow of credit.

Already we are seeing pressure in all three areas

At the moment, the direction of movement seems to be tightening rather than collapsing.

When it comes to withdrawals and marks, semi-liquid private credit vehicles are more aggressively restricting cash while investors seek fresher valuations.

According to a recent report, Cliffwater’s flagship corporate lending fund received redemptions representing about 14% of its shares, meeting just 7%, while Morgan Stanley’s North Haven Fund received redemptions representing 10.9% and met only 5% of its cap.

The report notes that while BlackRock and other vehicles also hit standard quarterly caps, Apollo moved to monthly and even daily NAV reporting in response to criticism of pricing staleness.

This reflects deteriorating liquidity conditions and concurrently increasing investor demand for faster price discovery and greater cash access.

When it comes to bank loans, lenders are becoming more selective rather than closing their doors completely.

A separate report said JPMorgan devalued some of its software-backed private credit collateral and restricted lending to affected funds, reducing borrowing capacity and harsher collateral treatment for weaker market players.

That stance is not universal. Other reports said banks were still willing to fund some withdrawal needs. The signal is narrower and more useful. Lenders are still present in the market, but they have become less tolerant of weak collateral and have shown a willingness to tighten terms on a fund-by-fund basis.

In terms of balance sheet growth, the NDFI loan book has already changed its behavior without having to completely downsize.

According to the FDIC’s February 2026 study, bank loans to NDFIs compounded at a rate of 21.9% annually from 2010 to 2024, reaching $1.32 trillion by the third quarter of 2025. Categories that have grown at that pace don’t need to shrink completely to reset underwriting.

Slower growth, more frequent price declines, and tighter funding conditions are not enough to change redemption behavior and reduce leverage, making investors assume that rapid balance sheet growth can continue alongside good losses.

Official figures refute today’s panic, but they do not support complacency.

FDIC balance sheet data shows that bank exposures shifted significantly after the crisis. Big banks are still connected to the private credit conglomerate through credit lines, according to the Fed’s research. Global data shows that non-bank finance is too big to be treated as a sideshow, and the first public experiments in private credit liquidity have already appeared on the market.

The next stress point is a step away from the embankment, so you may arrive by a route that seems safer when things are going well.

The next useful checkpoints are whether withdrawals remain subdued, whether bank lending continues, and whether the $1.32 trillion exposure recorded by the FDIC continues to rise as private credit faces a tough year.